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APPLYING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE TO THE STANDARD 
STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT 
MICHAEL J. MCCORMACK* 
Cognitive Science studies cognition by examining problem-solving, estab-
lishing general conceptual tools and guidelines by which novices may be-
come experts. Available to problem-solvers of all disciplines, including legis-
lators, these tools offer a means for evaluating legislation. For example, by 
using these tools to assess the problem-solving effort in Euclidean zoning as 
embodied in the Standard State Zoning Enabling Ad, it becomes clear that 
this Act could be improved in several ways: first, by shifting more of tlie de-
cision-making power to those with the most experience; and, second, by miti-
gating the electoral and judicial constraints upon these decision-makers. 
These steps will ensure that Euclidean zoning, as a problem-solving process 
with distinct phases, represents an effedive problem-solving effort. 
INTRODUCTION 
Euclidean zoning "envisions the specification of determined geo-
graphic areas separated according to zoning districts with the uses 
permitted in each district set forth in the ordinances."l Many writers 
criticize Euclidean zoning.2 Some, for example, argue that racism and 
elitism initially motivated-and presently perpetuate-Euclidean zon-
ing.3 Others criticize Euclidean zoning's inflexibility, arguing that it 
can work inequitable hardships on individual property owners.4 Yet 
other critics respond that the incorporation of too much flexibility 
into Euclidean zoning leads to discretionary abuse by administrators 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON CoLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW, 1999-
2000. This article is dedicated to Mutti, in response to her countless newspaper clippings. 
1 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1618-19 (6tl1 ed. 1990). 
2 See, e.g.,Joel Kosman, Toward an Inclusionaryjurisprudence: A Reconceptualization of Zon-
ing, 43 CAllI. U. L. REv. 59 (1993); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERI-
CAN CITIES (1961); JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE: REMAKING OUR 
EVERYDAY WORLD FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1996). 
~ See Kosman, supra note 2, at 60. 
4 SeeJESSE DUKEMINIER &JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1021 (3d ed. 1993). 
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and the favoring of certain property-owners over others.5 Finally, some 
question the efficacy of Euclidean zoning, asking whether it fixes the 
problem to which it was addressed.6 One approach to answering this 
question involves ascertaining whether zoning has produced a desir-
able state of affairs.7 This Note adopts an alternative approach, which 
asks whether Euclidean zoning, as a problem-solving process with dis-
tinct phases, represents an effective problem-solving effort. Cognitive 
Science offers the tools for such analysis.8 
Cognitive Science studies cognition by examining problem-
solving, seeking to understand what constitutes effective cognition by 
first understanding what constitutes effective problem-solving.9 This 
study involves, among other methods, the identification of what 
makes effective problem-solvers or "experts" effective and, conversely, 
the identification of what makes ineffective problem-solvers or "nov-
ices" ineffective.1° By identitying the mistakes typically made by nov-
ices-and avoided by experts-Cognitive Science seeks not merely to 
understand how novices differ from experts, but to establish general 
conceptual tools and guidelines by which novices may become ex-
perts. l1 These conceptual tools are available to problem-solvers of all 
disciplines, including legislators who, after all, are essentially elected 
problem-solvers.12 By considering the conceptual tools provided by 
Cognitive Science, legislators may avoid enacting ineffective legis la-
5 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1047 (citing LA. TIMES article reporting a 
Los Angeles city councilman's voting four times in one month to permit more extensive 
development) . 
6 See Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, ar Manhattanization?: Communal Aesthetics in 
Zoning Central City Real Estate Development, 78 B.U. L. REv. 445, 446 (1998). 
7 See KUNSTLER, supra note 2, at 109-49;JACOBS, supra note 2, at 222-69 passim. 
8 See generally DIETRICH DORNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE: RECOGNIZING AND AVOIDING 
ERROR IN COMPLEX SITUATIONS (1996); Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Exper-
tise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1995). 
9 Cognitive Science is alternatively described as the study of decision-making. See Blasi, 
supra note 8, at 318. This Note alternates between the expressions problem-solving and 
problem-solvers and decision-making and decision-makers. 
10 See Blasi, supra note 8, at 318. 
11 See id. Blasi's paper is meant to assist in reconstructing the practice and education of 
novice lawyers "who will eventually become better than [experts] are now." [d. at 317. 
12 See Blasi, supra note 8, at 342-43 (stating that empirical investigation has turned out 
data exploitable by Cognitive Science in areas as diverse as ·Soviet agricultural policy, the 
sentencing of defendants by magistrates, the diagnosis of illness by physicians, financial 
planning for retirement, and the analysis of business problems" [citations omitted]); see 
generally DORNER, supra note 8 (adopting computer simulations to mimic the actions of 
complex systems, Dorner tests subjects who act as, among other things, mayors and factory 
managers, in order to identify what constitutes effective problem-solving). 
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tion and regulation, i.e., legislation or regulation which does not 
remedy the problem to which it was addressed. 
Section I of this Note sets out the general tools and concepts 
Cognitive Science uses to analyze problem-solving. Section II consid-
ers Euclidean zoning as a problem-solving effort, identifYing both the 
initial goal of zoning and its current status as embodied in the Stan-
dard State Zone Enabling Act.13 Section III evaluates the problem-
13 AMERICAN LAw INST., STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABUNG ACT, reprinted in MODEL 
LAND DEV. CODE 210 (Tent. Draft No.1, 1968) [hereinafter STANDARD ACT]. The central 
sections of the Standard Act provide as follows: 
Section 1. Grant of Power-Empowers municipalities to "regulate and restrict 
the height, number of stories, and size of buildings and other structures, the 
percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other 
open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, 
structures, and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes." Id. at 
212-14. 
Section 2. Districts-Permits division of municipalities into districts (zones) of 
appropriate number, shape, and area, and provides that regulations may vary 
from district to district. See id. at 214. 
Section 3. Purposes in View-Requires that regulations be "made in accor-
dance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the 
streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote 
health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent 
the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to fa-
cilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, 
parks, and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with 
reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district 
and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving 
the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land 
throughout [the] municipality." Id. at 214-15. 
Section 4. Method of Procedure--Requires the enactment of procedures by 
which to establish, enforce, and change regulations. See id. at 215. 
Section 5. Changes--Permits modification and repeal of regulations. See id. at 
216-17. 
Section 6. Zoning Commission-Requires appointment of a zoning commis-
sion to recommend district boundaries and regulations. See id. at 217. 
Section 7. Board of Adjustment-Authorizes appointment of a board of ad-
justment to hear appeals and make special exceptions to regulations "in ap-
propriate cases and subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards . . . ," 
and also to permit "such variance from the terms of the ordinance as will not 
be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a literal 
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary 
hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and sub-
stantialjustice done." Id. at 218-20. 
Section 8. Enforcement and Remedies--Declares that violations of regula-
tions shall be misdemeanors punishable by fine or imprisonment; civil penal-
ties are also authorized. See id. at 220-21. 
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solving effort embodied in Euclidean zoning, using the conceptual 
tools and guidelines provided by Cognitive Science to idenfity how 
Euclidean zoning deviates from an optimal problem-solving effort. 
Finally, Section IV suggests ways to improve the problem-solving effort 
in Euclidean zoning as embodied in the Standard Act. 
I. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
Cognitive Science defines a problem as "any situation in which 
the current state of affairs varies from the desired state of affairs, 
when there is no obvious way to reach the desired state. "14 Cognitive 
Science focuses on problems as a means to understand problem-
solvers and, more specifically, the processes that make for effective 
problem-solving.15 Analyzing how effective problem-solvers deal with 
problems illuminates common errors in problem-solving.16 
A. Problem-solving Principles 
Cognitive scientists typically divide problem-solving efforts into 
distinct phases, evaluating each phase on its own terms to identify the 
most effective course of action at each phase.17 The phases can be 
summarized as follows: 
• formulation of goals; 
• formulation of models and gathering of information; 
• prediction and extrapolation; 
• planning of actions, decision making, and execution of actions; 
and, 
Section 9. Conflict with Other Laws-Provides that in instances of conflict be-
tween zoning regulations and other laws controlling land use, the more strin-
gent shall apply. 
See id. at 221. 
14 See Blasi, supra note 8, at 331. Blasi's preface to his article is equally applicable here. 
He notes that "despite the proliferation of interdisciplinary 'law and' movements, there is 
as yet no defined discourse about the application of Cognitive Science to lawyering prac-
tice." Id. at 320-21. This is no less true of legislative or administrative practice. As Blasi 
notes: "[a] substantial part of this essay is thus necessarily spent in bringing to an audience 
of lawyers and legal academics a subset of concepts and findings of Cognitive Science in a 
form that would doubtless seem extraordinarily oversimplified to an audience of cognitive 
scientists." Id. at 321. 
15 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 7-10. 
16 See id. passim. 
17 See id. at 43,49,71,153; Blasi, supra note 8, at 328. 
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• of actions and revision of strategy.lS 
As some have noted, stated abstractly, these phases do little more than 
warn, 'Think before you act. "19 By contrasting the conduct of an ex-
pert facing an extremely complex problem, however, with that of a 
novice at each of these problem-solving phases, the utility of these 
phases becomes evident.20 
1. Formulation of Goals 
Given the Cognitive Science definition of a problem-any situa-
tion in which the current state of affairs varies from the desired state 
of affairs, when there is no obvious way to reach the desired state-a 
decision-maker must decide first what state of affairs she desires.21 In 
Cognitive Science terms, the decision-maker must formulate a goa1.22 
Cognitive scientists categorize goals into the following groups: positive 
or negative; general or specific; clear or unclear; simple or multiple; 
and implicit or explicit.23 
Whether a goal is positive or negative depends on how a decision-
maker construes the desired state.24 Positive goals involve working to-
wards a desirable state and are generally stated as an affirmative desire 
to achieve x, the desired state of affairs.25 Negative goals, in turn, in-
volve an attempt to correct or prevent a deficient state of affairs and 
are generally stated as an affirmative desire to achieve something 
other than x, the deficient current or inevitable state of affairs.26 To 
see that a decision-maker can construe a goal either positively or 
negatively, consider the site of a toxic waste spill; insofar as the goal in 
cleaning such a spill is to achieve a certain level of toxicity, the goal is 
18 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 43; Blasi, supra note 8, at 328. While Blasi's phases differ 
slightly in terminology from Dorner's, the processes are essentially the same. For example, 
Blasi sets out the phases as: (1) identifying and diagnosing the problem; (2) generating 
alternative solutions and strategies; (3) developing a plan of action; (4) implementing the 
plan; and, (5) keeping the planning process open to new information and ideas. See id. at 
328. 
19 See Blasi, supra note 8, at 328. 
20 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 21-27 (contrasting the problem-solving traits of effec-
tive problem-solving test subjects with ineffective problem-solving test subjects). 
21 See id. at 43,49; Blasi, supra note 8, at 328, 331. 
22 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 43, 49; Blasi, supra note 8, at 328, 331. Blasi does not 
specifically use the term goal; rather, he discusses the identification of the problem and 
the generation of a solution. See Blasi, supra note 8, at 328, 331. 
23 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 49-52. 
24 See id. at 49-50. 
25 See id. at 50. 
26 See id. 
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positive.27 Insofar as the goal is to achieve something other than the 
present level of toxicity, the goal is negative.28 Positive goals require 
clear and definite articulation.29 Addressing the toxic waste site with a 
positive goal will require a decision-maker to identity exactly what 
state she would like to achieve.3O Conversely, negative goals tend to be 
vague and ill-defined.31 Explained in terms of what state the problem-
solver desires, negative goals do not specity a desired state other than 
to say that the present state is not it.32 Though the decision to con-
strue a goal positively or negatively seems a merely academic exercise, 
generally, the clearer a decision-maker defines her goal the more 
likely it will be achieved.33 Positive goals tend to be clearer than nega-
tive goals and, therefore, are more likely to be realized.34 
Another useful classification of goals concerns whether they are 
general or specific.35 Cognitive Science categorizes a goal as general 
where determining whether it has been achieved requires the exami-
nation of only a few criteria or a single criterion.36 For example, 
checkmating an opponent's king in the game of chess represents a 
general goal,37 A chessplayer may checkmate an opponent in a vast 
number of ways.38 Still, checkmating necessitates satistying one crite-
rion, namely, checkmating the king.39 Consider again the toxic waste 
example noted earlier. Even if a decision-maker were to articulate a 
desired level of toxicity, a goal to clean the site represents a general 
goal since the decision-maker need satisty only one criterion.4O Con-
versely, Cognitve science categorizes a goal as specific where determin-
ing whether it has been achieved requires the examination of a num-
ber of criteria.41 Consider, for example, the goal of the federal Clean 
Air Act to reach, among other things, levels of pollution which do not 
27 See id. 
28 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 50. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
Sl See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 50. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
38 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 50. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
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pose health risks.42 Determining whether the Clean Air Act has 
reached its goal, then, requires asking, inter alia, whether each of the 
levels specified for these five pollutants has been reached.43 The dis-
tinction between general and specific goals warrants notice because 
the specification of a general goal does little to clarify how this goal 
will be achieved; specific goals, on the other hand, force a decision-
maker to consider the various criteria she must meet to achieve this 
goal.44 As with positive and negative goals, the more specifically a deci-
sion-maker defines her goal, the more likely she will achieve it.45 Deci-
sion-makers, therefore, will more likely achieve specific goals than 
general goals.46 
The distinction between clear and unclear goals bears a close rela-
tion to that between general and specific goals.47 Cognitive Science 
categorizes both general and specific goals as clear goals; both types of 
goals offer some criterion or criteria by which to determine decisively 
whether the goal has been met.48 
In contrast, unclear goals offer no clear criteria to determine 
whether the goal has been met.49 Consider, for example, the Supreme 
Court's holding that Euclidean zoning is permissible insofar as its goal 
is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the community.50 
Granted, a decision-maker could describe the goal of a given instance 
of zoning as an attempt to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
42 See 42 u.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994). The specific levels for these pollutants-sulfur 
dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, suspended particulate~ carbon monoxide, ozone, and lead-
are set at a "harm based" level because the mandated quality levels are set by reference to 
ambient levels of pollutants that would limit harm to human health and the environment 
to acceptable levels. See id. § 7409. Notably, while the Act initially looks to harm as a guide 
to determine acceptable levels of pollution, seeming to recognize that the avoidance of 
harm is a negative and general goal, the primary mechanism through which the Act ulti-
mately takes effect for hazardous air pollutants is based on technology. See id.; see also ZYG-
MUNT J.B. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POllCY: NATURE, LAw, AND SOCIETY 
442, 446 (2d ed. 1998). The specification of a specific level of technology as a goal-in this 
case the maximum available control technoloy (MACT)-represents, in Cognitive Science 
terms, a positive, specific goal. See id.; DORNER, supra note 8, at 50. 
4~ See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671; DORNER, supra note 8, at 50. 
44 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 50. That is, had the Clean Air Act stipulated nothing 
more than that the air must be clean, and had not specified specific levels for various pol-
lutants, it would not be clear when the air would count as clean enough. See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401-7671; DORNER, supra note 8, at 50. 
45 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 50. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. at 50-51. 
49 See id. at 51. 
50 See discussion infra Section II.CA. 
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the community.51 But this goal provides no guide for determining 
whether zoning has, in fact, protected the community since there is 
no straightforward procedure for determining whether such protec-
tion is present.52 Consider again the Clean Air Act's specific standards 
for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, suspended particulates, carbon 
monoxide, ozone, and lead.53 Determining whether a given pollutant 
level has been met is simple.54 Determining whether a given pollutant 
standard sufficiently protects the health, safety, and welfare of the 
community is not so simple. 55 Based on the Cognitive Science hy-
pothesis that a decision-maker will more likely achieve clearly articu-
lated goals, unclear goals are even less susceptible to being achieved 
than general goalS.56 
As the discussion of specific goals suggests, a goal may actually 
comprise a number of other goals, which in Cognitive Science terms 
represents the difference between simple and multiple goals.57 For 
example, the Clean Air Act has, as an overarching simple goal, clean 
air. 58 As a means to achieve this overarching goal, EPA has established 
a number of sub-goals, including that concentrations of the pollutants 
described above be reduced to specified levels.59 
Finally, cognitive scientists distinguish between explicit and im-
plicit goals.60 A conscious decision to reach a specific state represents 
an explicit goa1.61 Often, however, a decision-maker does not con-
sciously formulate all the goals she would like to achieve or main-
tain.62 A goal that a decision-maker would categorize as part of the 
desired state of affairs were she to consider it exemplifies an implicit 
goa1.63 Consider, for example! the EPA's approval of methyl tertiary 
51 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 50; discussion infra Section II.CA. Instances of zoning 
include the granting of special exceptions and variances, as well as allowing cluster zoning, 
PUDs, and contract or conditional zoning. See discussion infra Section III.C.2. 
52 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 50. 
53 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671. 
54 See id. To be sure, EPA sets the acceptable levels of these pollutants by considering 
health impacts. See id. Nevertheless, EPA's specification of the levels which will not endan-
ger the community's health represents a shift from a fairly unclear goal to a clear goal. See 
id. 
55 See discussion infra Section II.C.4. 
56 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 51. 
57 See id. at 51. 
58 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671. 
59 Seeid. § 7403(g). 
60 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 52. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
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butyl ether (MTBE), a fuel additive used in reformulated gasolines 
(RFG).64 RFGs are employed in most U.S. urban areas during the win-
ter months to reduce air pollution.65 At the time of their introduction, 
RFGs were hailed as the painless, technology-fix alternative to chang-
ing driving behavior to reduce mobile source-emissions.66 MTBE, 
however, apparently has the capacity to contaminate wells when re-
leased in extremely small amounts, and was implicated in several well 
contamination cases in Maine, Massachusetts, and California.67 Here, 
in addition to its explicit goal of air pollution reduction, the EPA cer-
tainly would acknowledge an implicit goal not to worsen water condi-
tions.68 In short, decision-makers must be careful to avoid dwelling so 
intently on the problems they have, to prevent overlooking those they 
do not yet have.69 
Cognitive Science thus indicates that decision-makers should 
obey the following general principles when formulating goals.70 
Where possible, decision-makers should state goals positively, not 
negatively.71 They should formulate specific-not general-goals, 
which implies, of course, that they should formulate clear rather than 
unclear goals.72 Finally, decision-makers should strive to make implicit 
goals explicit.73 
64 See Scott Allen, Gas Additive Is Found to Contaminate Water, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 23, 
1998, at AI. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. MTBE has been detected in 23 public water supplies in Massachusetts and the 
US Geological Survey has reported finding MTBE in 20 percent of the wells it has moni-
tored in areas using RFGs. See id. 
68 In fairness, EPA does have an explicit goal not only not to worsen water conditions, 
but to improve them, under statutes such as the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking 
Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 300 (f)-U) (18) (1994). Still, the 
point is that in formulating goals, a decisionmaker must not ignore implicit goals. See 
DORNER, supra note 8, at 52. This is especially true for a regulatory agency as diverse in its 
regulatory scope as EPA. If, in enacting each of these statutes--i.e. goals--Congress and 
EPA do not at least consider the possible impacts on other realms, inconsistent goals will 
emerge. See id. at 57. 
69 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 52. 
70 See id. at 50-52. 
71 See id. at 50. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 52. 
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2. Formulation of Models and Gathering ofInformation 
Mter formulating a goal, a decision-maker must understand the 
current, undesirable state of affairs confronting her.74 Experienced 
decision-makers solve problems effectively, in large part because of 
their sophisticated comprehension of the complex systems confront-
ing them.75 That they are experienced implies that sophisticated 
comprehension requires prolonged exposure to a given system; un-
derstanding some general principles of complex systems, however, 
facilitates this process.76 
Cognitive Science defines a system as a "network of many vari-
ables in causal relationships to one another. "77 Complex systems con-
tain many interrelated variables.78 Further, a system of variables inter-
relates if action that affects or is meant to affect one element of the 
system also always affects other elements.79 This guarantees that an 
action aimed at one variable will have side effects and long-term re-
percussions.80 IdentifYing all the variables within a system may be 
difficult since some of these may be "intransparent" or invisible.81 
Complex systems, however, involve more than a multiplicity of interre-
lated variables; the nature of the relations between these variables 
likewise introduces complexity to the system.82 Generally, these inter-
relationships can be grouped into the categories of positive feedback, 
negative feedback, buffering, critical variables, and indicator vari-
ables.83 
In a relationship regulated by positive feedback, an increase in a 
given variable produces a further increase in that same variable.84 
Conversely, a decline in that variable produces a further decline.85 For 
example, animal and plant populations are to some extent regulated 
by positive feedback since the larger a population is, the more likely it 
74 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 74 (observing that "it is usually wise when correcting a 
deficiency to consider it within the context of its system."). 
75 See Blasi, supra note 8, at 342. 
76 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 74. 
77 See id. at 73. 
78 See id. at 38. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 40. 
82 See id. at 74. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
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is to continue growing.86 Positive feedback tends to undermine the 
stability of a system and a system in which many variables are regu-
lated by positive feedback can easily go awry.87 
In a relationship regulated by negative feedback, an increase in a 
given variable produces a decrease in another variable and vice 
versa.88 This kind of relationship tends to perpetuate the status quo, 
maintaining equilibrium in a system.89 Consider, for example, the re-
lationship of wolves and rabbits in an animal population. An increase 
in rabbits produces an increase in wolves. This, in turn, produces a 
decline in rabbits, which in turn produces a decline in wolves.90 
A system incorporating many variables governed by negative 
feedback is a well-buffered system.91 Such systems can absorb numer-
ous disturbances without becoming unstable.92 AIdo Leopold's de-
scription of the ''biotic pyramid" represents one such well-buffered 
system: 
Plants absorb energy from the sun. This energy flows 
through a circuit called the biota, which may be represented 
by a pyramid consisting of layers. The bottom layer is the 
soil. A plant layer rests on the soil, an insect layer on the 
plants, a bird and rodent layer on the insects, and so on up 
thourgh various animal groups to the apex layer, which con-
sists of the larger carnivores ... 
The velocity and character of the upward flow of energy 
depend on the complex structure of the plant and animal 
community, much as the upward flow of sap in a tree de-
pends on its complex cellular organization ... This interde-
pendence between the complex structure of the land and its 
smooth functioning as an energy unit is one of its basic at-
tributes. 
When a change occurs in one part of the circuit, many 
other parts must adjust themselves to it. Change does not 
necessarily obstruct or divert the flow of energy; evolution is 
a long series of self-induced changes, the net result of which 
86 SeeDORNER, supra note 8, at 74. 
87 See id. 
86 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 74-75. 
91 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 75. 
92 See id. 
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has been to elaborate the flow mechanism and to lengthen 
the circuit.93 
While relationships of positive and negative feedback represent a 
qualitative aspect to the relationship between a pair of variables, 
namely, how the variables affect one another, the relationship be-
tween variables within a complex system also manifests a quantitative 
aspect; some variables stand in such relationships to more variables 
than others.94 Cognitive scientists use the term "critical variable" for 
variables which interact mutually with a large number of other vari-
ables since altering such variables exerts a major influence on the 
status of the entire system.95 Variables which depend on many other 
variables while themselves exerting very little influence on the system 
are called "indicator variables.''96 Such variables provide important 
clues that help in assessing the overall status of a system.97 As some 
have noted "[l]ike the canaries that were carried into coal mines ... 
endangered species can be vivid living indicators of important human 
concerns. Endangered birdlife revealed the danger of DDT and other 
pesticides to humans. ''98 Indicator variables come in a variety of 
strengths; an indicator is weak when it causally relates to its system in 
an attenuated manner so that a number of other factors plausibly 
could be affecting the variable.99 
Generally, inexperienced decision-makers, then, do not under-
stand these general principles of systems, failing to comprehend the 
positive and negative feedback relationships which manifest changes 
in critical variables and send signals through indicator variables.1oo 
Besides grasping these general principles, a decision-maker must un-
derstand the particulars of the system confronting her.101 How can she 
quickly discern which variables are critical and which are indicators? 
93 ALno LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 214-20 (1948); see RACHEL CARSON, SI-
LENT SPRING 54-57 (1962). 
94 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 75. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 See PLATER, ET AL., supra note 42, at 692-93 (observing that "[i]n the snail darter 
case, when Justices, reporters or lVA's minions asked, 'What good is the snail darter?' the 
citizens responded that it was a sensitive physical and legal barometer of the highly specific 
qualities of its habitat ... "); see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embauled Social Utilities of the 
Endangered SPecies Act--a Noah Presumption, and a Caution against PuUing Gas Masks on the 
Canaries in the Coal Mine, 27 ENVTL. LAw 845 (1997). 
99 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 83. 
100 Seeid. at 71-73,75. 
101 See id. at 79. 
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Likewise, how can she quickly discern whether a given relationship 
represents positive or negative feedback? Cognitive Science suggests a 
number of time-saving methods.102 
Analogical reasoning represents one of the more effective tools 
in coming to grips with the particulars of a given system.103 Such rea-
soning involves comparisons between variables at an abstract leveI.104 
Consider, for example, the use of canaries in coal mines noted above. 
Contemplated at the level of species, humans and canaries differ radi-
cally from one another. Still, both fall under the more general cate-
gory of animal. The recognition that a novel variable-a canary-falls 
under the same category as a previously encountered variable-a hu-
man being-allows decision-makers to form hypotheses regarding the 
former variable based on knowledge of the latter. The recognition 
that the canary represents an indicator variable for an ecosystem's 
health (or our own) exemplifies analogical reasoning, namely, the 
hypothesis that, as animals, our health will be affected by the same 
sorts of variables that will adversely affect another animal, the canary. 
Analogical reasoning, then, allows decision-makers to compare indi-
vidual variables on a conceptual level and to form hypotheses con-
cerning newly encountered variables on the basis of experience re-
garding other variables.I°5 
Ultimately, problem-solving requires the development of a com-
prehensive understanding of a system.106 Analogical reasoning facili-
tates such understanding by allowing the formation of hypotheses 
about the relation of variables within the system.I07 As with goal set-
ting, hypotheses come in a variety of forms, some of which are gener-
ally more effective than others.I°8 One common ineffective hypothesis 
arises where a decision-maker facing an undesirable state of affairs in 
a complex system sets forth a single hypothesis to explain the entire 
system.I09 For example, some critics of Euclidean zoning argue that it 
102 See id. at 7&-78. 
103 See id. at 7&-77. 
104 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 7&-77. 
105 See id. While analogical reasoning involves considering a newly encountered vari-
able at a more abstract, conceptual level, another short<ut to understanding a system in-
volves moving to a more particularized level of understanding. See id. at 77. This knowl-
edge of the constituent elements of a system can provide insights into the structure of that 
system. See id. 
106 See id. at 74, 79. 
107 See id. at 77. 
108 See id. at 50-52, 89-91. 
109 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 89-90. 
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underlies the majority of today's social problems including exorbitant 
commuter costs and feelings of alienation, if not psychosis, among 
teenagers.110 Granted, reducing complex systems to a focus on a sin-
gle variable conserves decision-making resources.l11 These reductive 
hypotheses, however, tend to ignore many of the other central vari-
ables in a given system, as well as the many feedback loops in such sys-
tems.112 
This process of analogical reasoning and hypothesizing, there-
fore, enables a decision-maker to understand the particulars of a 
given system.ll3 The internalization of such understanding yields what 
Cognitive Science calls "schemata" (the plural of "schema"), or "mod-
els of the world" which "embody prototypical expectations about ob-
jects, situations, and actions."114 Like any model, a schema represents 
the relevant characteristics of that upon which it is modeled.ll5 Expe-
rience weeds out the irrelevant features.116 For example, a newcomer 
to chess sees only a variety of wooden pieces upon a flat playing 
board. A more experienced player might see a board with pieces 
moved out of initial position. An even more experienced player might 
recognize an opening, say, a Queen's Gambit. A chess grandmaster 
viewing the board might see all these things and more, such as a 
checkmate in five moves. While the board has not changed, experi-
ence provides a model for experts on which to base expectations, a 
model which literally alters how they perceive the board.117 
Thus, expertise involves the ability to match problem patterns 
with stored problem schemata, and to detect and remember patterns 
in a complex set of phenomena that are essentially invisible to nov-
110 See KUNSTLER, supra note 2, at 54-55, 67-70. 
111 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 90. 
112 See ill. As cognitive scientists have noted, rejecting previously held reductive hy-
potheses is not as simple as one might think because their simplistic explanations for what 
goes on in the world account not only for their popularity, but also their persistence. See ill. 
at 91. When a problem-solver's hypothesis yields what she believes to be the structure of a 
system, she will be reluctant to abandon her hypothesis where doing so will return her to 
an undifferentiated system of interacting variables linked in no immediately obvious hier-
archy. See ill. at 92. Such a lack of differentiation produces uncertainty, which, in turn, 
produces fear, entrenching the reductive hypothesis. See ill. Decision-makers, therefore, 
avoid reductive hypotheses only when they are willing to change these hypotheses in re-
sponse to conflicting or anomalous evidence. See id. 
113 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 76-78. 
114 See Blasi, supra note 8, at 337. 
115 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 41-42,94; Blasi, supra note 8, at 336-37. 
116 See Blasi, supra note 8, at 343. 
117 See id. at 343-44. 
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ices. l1S Cognitive Science suggests that inexperienced decision-makers 
can develop understanding more quickly by (1) consciously choosing 
to understand the system in terms of the general principles of com-
plex systems, and (2) reasoning analogically and forming hypotheses 
to understand the relations of the specific variables within this sys-
tem.119 
3. Prediction and Extrapolation 
Having formulated a goal and developed an understanding of 
the system, a decision-maker may predict effectively how the system 
will respond to remedies.120 Predicting how actions will affect a given 
system requires extrapolating from the current state, limiting focus on 
a notable feature and inferring a trend regarding this feature,121 Con-
sider, for example, the decision to mine for gold by the Placer 
method,122 Placer mining is one of the four basic methods for mining 
metal ore, involving alluvial or glacial deposits of loose gravel, sand, 
soil, clay, or mud called "placers."123 Once a placer miner has exca-
vated the gold-bearing material or "paydirt" from a placer deposit, he 
118 See id. 
119 See DORNER, sUfrra note 8, at 72-79. A question remains, however, as to when 
sufficient information concerning a given system has been gathered; in exceptionally 
complex systems, a decision-maker conceivably could gather information interminably, 
refining hypotheses about how the variables in the system interact. See id. at 78, 79. Gener-
ally, in the face of time constraints, ineffective, novice decision-makers will be less likely to 
gather information in the early phases of decision-making and will be more eager to act; 
effective, novice decision-makers, in contrast, will be more likely to gather information and 
less likely to act. See id. at 103. The initial inference, then, seems to be that a novice deci-
sion-maker should err on the side of more, rather than less, information. See id. Granted, 
this provides little help. Moreover, in the absence of time constraints, the tendencies of 
effective and ineffective novice decision-makers transpose, with the former tending to 
gather less information before acting; the latter, in turn, tend to gather too much informa-
tion, leading to uncertainty and the desire for more information, yielding yet more uncer-
tainty, a vicious circle which inhibits the decision-making process. See id. at 104. Finally, 
while expert decision-makers tend to act more quickly than novices in routine situations, 
in non-routine situations, novices tend to act more quickly than experts. See Blasi, sUfrra 
note 8, at 344-45. Although it may be unsettling to realize that no amount of experience 
will provide an a frriori answer as to how much information must be gathered before a deci-
sion-maker should execute a plan, effective decision-making requires decision-makers to 
revise hypotheses and correct actions. &e DORNER, sUfrra note 8, at 43, 78; Blasi, sUfrra note 
8, at 328. . 
120 See DORNER, sUfrra note 8, at 43; Blasi, sUfrra note 8, at 328. 
121 See DORNER, sUfrra note 8, at 109. 
122 See Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1990). 
12~ See id. 
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will separate it from the other materials in the paydirt by a gravity-
separation process know as "sluicing. "124 In such a process: 
a miner places the ore in an on-site washing plant ... which 
has small submerged dams . . . attached to its bottom. He 
causes water to be run over the paydirt in the sluice box; 
when the heavier materials fall, they are caught by the 
[dams]. The lighter sand, dirt, and clay particles are left sus-
pended in the wastewater released from the sluice box. 
Placer mining typically is conducted directly in streambeds 
.... The water usually enters the sluice box through gravity 
.... At some point after the process described above, the wa-
ter in the sluice box is discharged. The discharges from 
placer mining can have aesthetic and water-quality impacts 
on waters both in the immediate vicinity and downstream. 
Toxic metals, including arsenic, cadmium, lead, zinc, and 
copper, have been found in higher concentration in streams 
where mining' occurs than in non-mining streams.125 
In order to avoid such consequences, a miner considering sluicing a 
river would hypothesize as to the effect of water flow on toxic level 
metals in the stream.126 Once the interrelation of these variables is 
understood, a decision-maker can predict reliably how an increase in 
water-flow will affect such levels.127 This prediction will require ex-
trapolating from the current state the effects that water flow has on 
toxic metal levels, followed by a prediction as to the consequences of 
an increase in water flow.128 Understanding a system as a dynamic 
process, as opposed to a fixed state, allows extrapolation as to how the 
system will look in the future if left to itself and facilitates predictions 
regarding how the system will react to externally imposed actions.129 
4. Planning of Actions, Decision-Making, and Execution of Actions 
During the planning phase, decision-makers develop chains of 
proposed action which comprise three elements: a condition element, 
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. 
127 See Rybachek, 904 F.2d at 1282. 
128 See id. at 1282, 1289. Notably, EPA's determination of BMP recognizes that such 
considerations are feasible, both technologically and economically, for those in the busi-
ness. See id. at 128~7. 
129 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 79. 
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an action element, and a result element.1OO For example, in an ideal 
articulation of planning, a decision-maker will posit: "given such and 
such conditions, I could take this action and achieve that result. "131 
Cognitive Science suggests a number of planning methods.132 
Where a chain of proposed action, for example, involves a plethora of 
actions and intervening results, one effective method of planning 
consists of starting from the desired state and positing backwards, a 
process called "reverse planning."133 Still, a decision-maker can plan 
her actions completely only rarely and in relatively uninteresting ar-
eas, whether in forward or reverse.134 Decision-makers typically en-
counter extremely complicated problems, involving many unforsee-
able factors. Planning generally requires a decision-maker to focus on 
a limited portion of reality, what Cognitive Science calls the "problem 
sector," to determine the possible effects she can have there,135 Con-
sequently, in the majority of cases, narrowing the problem sector will 
allow more effective problem-solving,136 For instance, a decision-
maker can focus on what actions she will choose and, in a procedure 
known as "hill climbing," consider only those actions that promise a 
step toward the goal.137 Consider, for example, the process of 
Brownfielding.138 EPA recognized that its current practices regarding 
toxic spills were not deterring spills, but were engendering large areas 
of abandoned brownfields.139 Consequently, EPA entered into con-
tracts with the owners of contaminated property and prospective pur-
chasers exonerating them from any future environmental liability at 
the site and obligating the EPA not to sue the purchaser for any exist-
ing contamination.l40 While its decision to allow moderate cleaning 
attempts will not guarantee greenfields, it is nevertheless a step in the 
right direction. HI 
150 See id. at 154. 
mId. 
132 See id. at 155, 157-60. 
133 See id. at 155; see also Blasi, supra note 8, at 345. Consider, for example, a fairly popu-
lar children's game where participants must navigate a maze drawn on paper by drawing a 
line from the start of the maze to its exit. One reliable approach to navigating such mazes 
involves starting at the exit and working backwards to the beginning. 
134 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 157. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See id.; see also Blasi, supra note 8, at 334. 
158 See PLATER, supra note 42, at 921. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at 922. 
141 See id.; see also DORNER, supra note 8, at 157. 
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Alternatively, a decision-maker can focus on what goals she wants 
to reach and, perhaps by using reverse decision-making, develop 
strong intermediate goals.142 The constant worry that a chosen goal 
may be reachable from either the current state (in forward planning) 
or the desired state (in reverse planning) but not both states suggests 
a strategy based on what Cognitive Science calls "diversity-efficiency:" 
decision makers should prefer goals which offer more options over 
those which offer fewer options.143 In chess, for example, experienced 
players generally prefer courses of action which place pawns or con-
trol on the center four squares of the board since this allows efficient 
movement in multiple directions.l44 Finally, decision-makers can at-
tempt to narrow their problem sector by selecting actions on the basis 
of their frequency of success in the past.l45 
Not all of these problem sector narrowing strategies, however, 
apply in all situations.146 Reverse planning, for example, works poorly 
or not at all when the goals identified by the decision-maker are not 
clear.147 Hill climbing's focus on actions rather than results indicates 
that it should be used only when there is almost complete uncertainty 
about the structure of the problem sector; otherwise, the focus should 
be on results, i.e., intermediate goals.148 
Finally, in planning, decision-makers must be carefullest they fall 
into the dangerous habit of choosing an action solely because it 
worked in the past, a practice known as "methodism. "149 This can lead 
to ignoring relevant variables in the current state and thus inhibit so-
lution.150 Essentially, methodism focuses on the action and result ele-
ments of planning while discounting the condition element.l5l While 
discounting the condition element will facilitate planning, it will also 
lead to problems during execution.152 For instance, some critics of 
Euclidean zoning argue that antiquated notions of a happy, peaceful 
home on the edge of a frontier motivate the desire to have homes 
142 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 158; Blasi, supra note 8, at 334. 
143 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 158. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. 
148 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 158. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 170-72. 
151 See id. at 167-68. 
152 See id. at 167. 
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separated from neighbors and other urban conditions,15! This dis-
counts present conditions, ignores differences between the present 
and the past, and assumes that what produced happiness in the past-
a home separated from neighbors and urban conditions-will con-
tinue to produce happiness in the future,154 
Conversely, attempting to narrow the problem sector field may 
over-narrow the focus and, consequently, a decision-maker occasion-
ally can more effectively navigate a problem sector by expanding the 
problem sector.I55 One expansion method, "free experimentation," 
mandates that decision-makers consider all options, not merely those 
that appear to lead to the ultimate goal.I56 Alternatively, decision-
makers can simply identify the features common to the previous inef-
fective approaches and pare away these unsuccessful features when 
developing new strategies.I57 
5. Review of Effects of Actions and Revision of Strategy 
Having proceeded through the first four phases of problem solv-
ing, decision-makers must ascertain whether a given goal has been 
reached. ISS If not, principles of effective decision-making require that 
the previous four steps be considered in light of their conse-
quences.159 Frequently, however, decision-makers avoid considering 
the consequences of their actions, engaging in what has been called 
"ballistic behavior," where decision-makers treat their actions like 
cannonballs by assuming them to be completely out of their control 
once launched,160 Effective decision-makers, in contrast, constantly 
gauge the efficacy of their actions, correcting for deviations-in a 
sense, guiding the action to its goal,161 
155 See KUNSTLER, supra note 2, at 28-31. Kunstler also argues tIlat tile desire to have a 
manor, as exemplified in plantation homes in tile Soutll, likewise motivates tile current 
zoning practice of sprawling out residences. See id. at 30. 
154 See id. at 33. 
155 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 159-60. 
156 See id. at 159. 
157 See id. 
156 See id. at 177. 
159 See id. at 43, 177; see also Blasi, supra note 8, at 328. 
160 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 178. 
161 See id. 
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II . .AN ATTEMPT AT PROBLEM-SOLVING: ZONING 
Understanding the decision-making process which led to the de-
velopment of zoning requires consideration of the status of zoning 
immediately before and following Euclid v. Ambler !Wally Co., the 
United States Supreme Court's first decision upholding the constitu-
tionality of zoning.162 This requires an understanding of precisely 
what problem the Court thought zoning would address, which in turn 
requires a modicum of background information as well as a detailed 
discussion of the arguments presented to the Court. While there have 
been many zoning cases since Euclid, this Note will focus only on cases 
which are relevant from a problem-solving perspective, i.e., which 
represent a substantial variation from, or novel supplement to, either 
the goals identified in Euclid, or to the problem-solving plan estab-
lished at that time. 
A. Before Euclid 
Prior to the 1900s, the bodies of doctrine on servitudes and nui-
sance represented the primary control over land use,163 Immediately 
prior to Euclid, a majority of state high courts had considered and up-
held some form of zoning ordinance.l64 These decisions typically 
justified zoning by broadly interpreting the state's police power to 
protect property owners from the threats of urban expansion.l65 More 
specifically, property owners, especially those owning single-family 
homes, needed protection from the negative attributes of the en-
croaching cities, such as noise, congestion, and apartment houses, 
elements implying the presence of large numbers of people,166 Since 
162 See 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Both this case and the subject of zoning in general have 
been analyzed so frequently, in fact, that some have felt that "[w]riting about zoning in the 
1990s ... raises the question of what a person can productively add to the topic." Kosman, 
supra note 2, at 60. 
163 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 991; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN LAw 678 (2d ed. 1985). 
164 See Edward D. Landels, Zoning: An Analysis of Its Purposes and Its Legal Sanctions, 17 
A.BA. J. 163, 163 (1931) (arguing that zoning's primary purpose is to protect value of 
property and utility of owner). 
165 See, e.g., Millerv. Board of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381, 383 (Cal. 1925); City of Aurora v. 
Burns, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (Ill. 1925); Ware v. City of Wichita, 214 P. 99,101 (Kan.1923); 
State ex reL Beeryv. Houghton, 204 N.W. 569, 570 (Minn. 1925), aff'd, 273 U.S. 671 (1927); 
State ex reL Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 176 N.W. 159, 161 (Minn. 1920) (Twin 
City II), revgon rehearing, 174 N.W. 885 (Minn. 1920); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 150 N.E. 120, 
122 (N.Y. 1925). 
166 See, e.g., Miller, 234 P. at 383; Burns, 149 N.E. at 788; Ware, 214 P. at 101; Houghton, 
204 N.W. at 570; Twin City Bldg., 176 N.W. at 161; Wulfsohn, 150 N.E. at 122. 
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protecting against the threat of haphazard growth required a munici-
pal police power whose reach could adjust to changing conditions 
and challenges, a considerably elastic police power developed.167 
Though previously unjustified, the municipal police power allowed 
protecting against such growth.l68 
Theoretically, this approach balanced the individual's right to 
private property against the collective property right of the commu-
nity.l69 In the decade before Euclid, most courts hearing zoning chal-
lenges held in favor of the community.170 Zoning, then, was meant to 
address threats to property rights. l7l 
B. Euclid's Beginnings in District Court 
Before 1922, the Village of Euclid, Ohio, resisted annexation by 
Cleveland, and remained a "single-family, middle-class residential 
suburb."172 In 1922, the Village Council, which specifically dubbed 
Euclid a "residential suburb,"173 passed a modern zoning ordinance to 
"'preserve the present character of the Village.'"174 Ambler Realty 
167 See, e.g., Miller, 234 P. at 383; Ware, 214 P. at 101; Houghton, 204 N.W. at 570; Twin 
City Bldg., 176 N.W. at 161; Wulfsohn, 150 N.E. at 122. 
166 See, e.g., Miller, 234 P. at 383-84; Beery, 204 N.W. at 570; Twin City Bldg., 176 NW. at 
161; see also Spector v. Building Inspector, 145 N.E. 265, 267 (Mass. 1924) (discussing the 
"problems~ that Milton sought to avoid). 
169 See Burns, 149 N.E. at 788; City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 184 N.W. 823, 
829 (Iowa 1921); Wulfsohn, 150 N.E. at 124. Some have argued that this dichotomy be-
tween the property rights of the individual and the community entirely ignored the claims 
of a third group, those effectively excluded from a community or its most desirable neigh-
borhoods by the operation of a zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Kosman, supra note 2, at 87. 
Still, there is a notable exception to this dichotomizing tendency in the dissenting opinion 
filed by Chief Justice Brown of the Minnesota Supreme Court, which did take into account 
these third-party interests. See Twin City Bldg., 176 N.W. at 163-64 (Brown, CJ., dissenting). 
170 See Burns, 149 N.E. at 788; Manhattan Oil, 184 N.W. at 829; Wulfsohn, 150 N.E. at 
124. But see Willison v. Cooke, 130 P. 828 (Colo. 1913) (holding that, in such context, indi-
vidual rights would prevail). 
171 Some have argued that there were grounds for some alternative form of zoning, for 
example, the equal distribution of people within a municipality's residential districts or the 
preservation of the opportunity to live in a community or district of one's choice. See Kos-
man, supra note 2, at 87. 
172 See William M. Randle, Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats, and Cronies: The Players in 
Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 31, 31 (Charles M. Haar &Jerold 
S. Kayden eds., 1989). 
17$ See Arthur V.N. Brooks, The Office File Box-Emanations from the Battlefield, in ZONING 
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 73, at 25 n.10 (quoting from the preamble to the 
Euclid zoning ordinance). 
174Id. at 6 (quoting from the preamble to the Euclid zoning ordinance). According to 
William Randle, Euclid's ordinance grew directly out of the East Cleveland ordinance. See 
Randle, supra note 172, at 40. 
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Company (Ambler) owned undeveloped land in Euclid near the east-
ern border of Cleveland.175 This land was south of the Nickel Plate 
Railway and north of Euclid Avenue.176 Due to the Village's zoning 
ordinance, Ambler could only use the first 150 feet of land for single-
family dwellings; the next 470 feet for two-family dwellings; and the 
next 130 feet for apartment buildings.177 Ambler could use the re-
mainder of the tract for industrial and manufacturing purposes.178 
Moreover, "[m]any additional restrictions [were] imposed as to the 
height of any and all kinds of buildings, as to the lot area which may 
be built on and which must be left free, and as to the set-back dis-
tances from street and lot lines."179 
When Ambler brought suit challenging the validity of these ordi-
nances, the district court struck down Euclid's zoning ordinance be-
cause it exceeded the municipality's police power-it did not pro-
mote the public peace, order, morals, or safety.lSO Consequently, the 
court found that the ordinance amounted to a taking of Ambler's 
175 See Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 30S-09 (N.D. Ohio 1924), 
rev'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
176 See id. at 309. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 [d. 
180 See Euclid, 297 F. at 314,316,317. The district court held: 
Obviously, police power is not susceptible of exact definition. It would be 
more difficult, even if it were not unwise, to attempt a more exact definition 
than has been given. And yet there is a wide difference between the power of 
eminent domain and the police power; and it is not true that the public wel-
fare is a justification for the taking of private property for the general good 
... A law or ordinance passed under the guise of the police power which in-
vades private property as above defined can be sustained only when it has a 
real and substantial relation to the maintenance and preservation of the pub-
lic peace, public order, public morals, or public safety. The courts never hesi-
tate to look through the false pretense to the substance. 
[d. at 314. 
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property without just compensation.18l Even as it rendered its hold-
ing, the district court foresaw that the matter would not stop there.182 
C. Euclid's Move to the Supreme Court 
1. Euclid's Brief: The Collective Good of the Community 
On appeal, Euclid relied on the increasing popularity of zoning 
and the similarity of its ordinance to the judicially-sanctioned ordi-
nances of other states,183 More specifically, Euclid concentrated on the 
comprehensive benefits of zoning in general, not the specific zoning 
ordinance it had passed.184 Euclid construed the "basic question" to 
be "whether there be a constitutional power to enact such ordinances 
as the one in question" and provided an exhaustive review of case law 
showing that courts were increasingly recognizing the zoning author-
ity of municipalities.18S 
Euclid also argued that its zoning ordinance promoted the gen-
eral welfare by positively affecting property values.18G Thus, Euclid's 
zoning ordinance benefited the community as a whole.187 More 
specifically, the Village focused on the benefits to the community en-
gendered by separating residential and industrial uses.188 Also, it ar-
181 See id. at 312, 317. The court concluded: 
The plain truth is that the true object of the ordinance in question is to 
place all the property in an undeveloped area of 16 square miles in a straight 
jacket. The purpose to be accomplished is really to regulate the mode of liv-
ing of persons who may hereinafter inhabit it. In the last analysis, the result to 
be accomplished is to classifY the population and segregate them according to 
their income or situation in life. 
[d. at 316. 
182 See id. at 308 (commenting that "[t]his case is obviously destined to go higher"). 
183 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389. 
184 See id. passim. 
185 Brief and Argument for Appellant, reprinted in 24 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGU-
MENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 411, 501-03 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter Appellant Documents, 24 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS] . 
186 See id. at 483-94. 
187 See id. at 483. 
188 See id. at 483-85. The appellant argued: 
Under zoning, the territory is opened to the shop keeper or to the store-
keeper only when and only as public consideration and general welfare and 
as the general trend dictate and the necessary enactment would naturally be 
noted only when the residence district becomes obsolete or has grown to be 
worn out or when it presents a situation where the general welfare would be 
better served if trades or factories or other uses were allowed to come in. 
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gued that zoning increased the feasibility of building thoroughfaresI89 
and promoted the "greater public welfare" of the "American 
home. "190 In short, zoning ordinances protected "the American 
People and American Principles" by protecting districts comprising 
single-family dwellings from the harm of encroaching commercial 
uses.I91 For Euclid, zoning mitigated change, and helped maintain 
what the Village's residents valued in America, ensuring that everyone 
in Euclid had a home with a yard, that children would have safer and 
happier upbringings, and that streets would be cleaner.I92 
2. Ambler's Brief: The Good of the Individual 
While Euclid focused on the good of the community via the 
benefits of zoning ordinances in general, Ambler concentrated on 
using its land for commercial purposes and the specific shortcomings 
of the ordinance.I9S Focusing on individual property rights, Ambler 
argued that its land's value would be greater if used for business or 
industrial purposes rather than residential purposes.I94 Attempting to 
counter Euclid's claim that the ordinance enhanced the general wel-
fare,I95 Ambler argued that enabling it to build as it wished to bring 
Id. at 486. 
189 See Appellant Documents, 24 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS at 485-90. 
190 Id. at 490. 
191 See id. at 490-91. As Euclid's brief stated: 
[M]odern tendencies are rapidly destroying and undermining the continu-
ance of separate and individual homes and residences. 
The best minds of America are exhorting Congress and the States to do all 
that is possible in order to stem and prevent this tendency. As each city grows, 
there are proportionately less families living in houses than in apartments 
and tenements and above stores. The bulwark and the stamina of this country 
has always been credited and conceded to the home owning tendencies of 
the American People. 
Id. 
192 See id. at 490-94. 
193 See Brief and Argument for Appellee, 24 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS 565, 
565 [hereinafter Appellee Documents, 24 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS]. 
194 Seeid. at 608-09 (citing Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 309 (N.D. 
Ohio 1924), retJ'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926». 
195 See id. at 592. The appellee argued: 
How can it be said that this Ordinance is addressed to any of the well-
known objects of the police power under such circumstances, for the Ordi-
nance does not attempt to protect residences from the proximity of industrial 
undertakings, but only to protect certain sections of land from being occu-
pied by both uses. This section conclusively shows that the Ordinance is not 
designed to protect the health, safety and comfort of the public. 
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jobs and money into Euclid would promote the community's general 
welfare.I96 Ambler, then, attempted to construe the general welfare in 
terms of economic development-insofar as restricting property to 
residential development thwarts such development, the general wel-
fare suffers.I97 
Ambler further argued that, even if protecting the residential dis-
trict did further the general welfare, Euclid's ordinance protected 
only a portion of the community's welfare,198 In the most restrictive 
residential district, Ambler argued, corner lot sizes must be at least 
4000 square feet, while the least restrictive district permitted lots as 
small as 700 square feet.IOO Ambler said such restrictions were irra-
tional since what would suffice for a family in one section of the Vil-
lage should be adequate for the entire Village.2OO Ambler also noted 
that those living in districts with larger minimum lot sizes would be 
"more prosperously environed" and in "a superior economic ostenta-
tion" than those in districts with smaller minimum lot sizes, implying a 
class-based motive for the zoning ordinance.201 Further, Ambler ar-
gued, Euclid's zoning ordinance was irrational insofar as it was in-
tended to benefit the community at large, yet granted the most pro-
tection to districts with the fewest residents and the most single-family 
homes.202 Pointing out that under Euclid's ordinance the greatest 
[d. 
196 See id. at 610-12. 
197 Appellees contended that the ordinance "imposes upon the general welfare the 
burden of having the business and industry of the Village of Euclid and the City of Cleve-
land diverted to less favorable and less available lands in order to maintain the favorable 
character for certain residence property ... [t]his property in the interest of the public 
welfare, should be devoted to those industrial uses for which it is needed and most appro-
priate." [d. at 611. 
198 See Appellee Documents, 24 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS at 587-97. 
199 See id. at 593. 
200 See id. The appellee argued: 
Manifestly, if the health, safety and comfort of a family require 5,000 
square feet of lot area in one part of the Village of Euclid they require it in all 
parts of the Village. Conversely, if the health, safety and comfort of a family 
are adequately provided for by a minimum of 700 square feet of lot area in 
any part of the Village of Euclid, the same minimum will serve the same pur-
pose in every part of the Village. 
[d. 
201 See id. 
202 See id. at 646-49. The appellee challenged the Village's use of its "police power": 
The ordinance is declared to be in fulfillment of a desire of the citizens of 
the village to "preserve the present character of said village" and to provide 
"for the general welfare of the citizens thereof,» which mayor may not be for 
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minimum lot size districts had the fewest residents, Ambler noted that 
"[t]he lots on which the fewest people live are required to have the 
largest free area for light and air while those in which the most people 
live have minimum requirements for ventilation and light. "2O!l Finally, 
Ambler discussed what it believed to be the real motivation for 
Euclid's zoning ordinance, the protection of those wealthy enough to 
afford living in Euclid's exclusive residence districts.204 Ambler con-
cluded by warning that the power to zone "is not the power merely to 
negative dangerous or anti-social uses, but the power affirmatively to 
select among admittedly harmless uses those which the political 
power deems the most popular and to prohibit all others. "205 
3. An Amicus Brief: The Good of City Planners? 
In addition to the briefs filed on behalf of Euclid and Ambler, 
Alfred Bettman filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of, inter alia, the 
National Conference on City Planning, writing "to discuss solely the 
question of the constitutionality of [modern] comprehensive zoning," 
and to urge the Court to affirm its constitutionality.206 Bettman ar-
gued that zoning "represent[ed] a pressing need in growing Ameri-
can cities and urban regions," such that the Court should uphold any 
the general welfare, as that term is properly used; that is to say, the general 
welfare which is the basis of the police power does not necessarily mean the 
particular local and private welfare of the people, or of some of the people, 
resident within the accidental political limits of the village. The general wel-
fare which recognizes the Village of Euclid as merely a constituent element of 
our general society and expects it to share the burdens, as it enjoys the 
benefits common to that society, is the general welfare upon which the police 
power rests. 
Id. at 646. 
205 Appellee Documents, 24 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS at 648. 
204 See id. Appellee argued: 
[F]rom [the "most healthful and desirable" residence districts] all are ex-
cluded except those who are able to maintain the more costly establishments 
of single family residences .... No apartment house or two-family house can 
be erected in [these districts], and yet the men, women and children who, for 
reasons of convenience or necessity, live in apartment houses or in the more 
restricted surroundings of two-family residences are of all others most in need 
of the refreshing access to the lake or the better air of the wooded upland. 
Id. at 648-49. 
205 Id. at 652. 
206 See Brief on Behalf of the National Conference on City Planning, The Ohio State 
Conference on City Planning, The National Housing Association, and The Massachusetts 
Federation of Town Planning Boards, Euclid (No. 31), 24 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGU-
MENTS 763, 763 [hereinafter Amicus Brief, 24 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS]. 
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"true" zoning ordinance.207 Further, Bettman urged the Court, zoning 
ordinances should be found constitutional where the goal is to pre-
vent "excessive gathering of human beings within a designated 
space,"208 and to prevent developments that might "have a detrimen-
tal effect upon the public health, safety, convenience, morals and wel-
fare."209 
Notably, Bettman argued that, while zoning "aim[ed] to improve 
the good order of the cities," it was not meant to function in terms of 
aesthetics.210 Rather, zoning was meant to promote "those beneficial 
effects upon health and morals which come from living in orderly and 
decent surroundings. "211 He predicted that without zoning, communi-
ties inevitably would devolve into "blighted districts whose general 
conditions are more promotive of sickness and delinquency. ''212 Like 
Euclid, Bettman focused on the promotion of residential values claim-
ing that through zoning, "the building of homes is promoted," and 
the environment "stabilized"; after all, "[n]o person who believes in 
homes and healthful home surroundings can fail to believe in the sta-
bilized residential environment.''213 
207 See id. at 767. A "true" zoning ordinance was defined as an ordinance featuring "a 
comprehensive distribution of the whole or a major portion of the territory of the com-
munity among all the necessary uses of every kind, each with appropriate standards of 
height and occupancy, all worked out as a community plan for the promotion of the com-
mon health, safety and welfare." ld. at 763. 
208 See id. at 787. 
209 See id. at 789. 
210 See Amicus Brief, 24 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS at 791. 
mId. Bettman continued, in language which the Court itself may have adopted, see in-
fra note 229, as follows: 
[T]he man who seeks to place the home for his children in an orderly neigh-
borhood, with some open space and light and fresh air and quiet, is not moti-
vated so much by considerations of taste or beauty as by the assumption that 
his children are likely to grow mentally, physically and morally more healthful 
jn such a neighborhood than in a disorderly, noisy, slovenly, blighted and 
slum-like district. This assumption is indubitably correct. 
ld. As Bettman further articulated: 
"Own your own home" is a slogan based on this realization of the advan-
tages, in the way of health, which come from the home which has a surround-
ing or environment of sunlight, air, quiet, and cleanliness. Parents prefer to 
bring up children in such environment, not for any snobbish or aesthetic rea-
sons, but because it promotes the health, mental, moral and physical, of the 
children. 
ld. at 794. 
mId. at 796. 
mId. at 797. 
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Approving of cases rejecting challenges to zoning ordinances 
which excluded apartment houses from "exclusively single-family 
home districts," Bettman argued that apartment houses did not war-
rant the same protection as single-family homes.214 Further, he quoted 
a study that suggested that preferential treatment should be given to 
single-family homes over apartment houses and other uses.215 The 
growth of zoning, as well as its increasing acceptance by state supreme 
courts, Bettman argued, warranted affirmation by the United States 
Supreme Court.216 
4. The Court's Holding: The Good of the Community over the Good 
of the Individual 
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of 
modern zoning, holding that it was an acceptable use of the police 
power because it shielded untainted municipalities from problems 
that would harm their general welfare.217 Moreover, the Court en-
couraged the creation of residential districts, effectively ensuring their 
preservation by approving the use of the police power to zone out all 
commercial and business uses, including apartment houses and simi-
lar multiple family dwellings.218 In upholding the constitutionality of 
zoning, the Court found that changes in American society in the early 
20th century necessitated zoning and that apartment buildings were 
as vile as Bettman had suggested.219 
In considering the changes to the country, the Court noted that 
as the country became larger and more complex, municipalities 
needed the power to control development within their borders and to 
214 [d. at 776; see also id. at 776-80. 
215 See Amicus Brief, 24 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS at 801. Bettman wrote: 
Different classes of business and industries are segregated to districts 
adapted to their needs. Apartments and double houses are allotted to other 
territories while areas for single houses are always provided. The desirability 
of zoning laws in suburbs of large cities seems to be proven by the experience 
of many home communities where it has been tried. Retail business, manu-
facturing and nuisances are not allowed to creep into residential districts, de-
stroying home values and undermining the elements of permanency and ex-
clusiveness, which make residential districts desirable. 
[d. (citation omitted). 
216 See id. at 767, 777-80. 
217 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87. 
218 See id. at 390-91. 
219 See id. at 386-87, 394. 
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protect themselves against growth and change.22o The Court con-
cluded that while certain larger municipalities like Cleveland already 
displayed the adverse effects of rapid growth, smaller municipalities 
like Euclid which had not experienced such growth effects needed 
the power to protect themselves from such effects.221 In contrasting 
Euclid with Cleveland, the Court observed that: 
the village, though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politi-
cally a separate municipality; with powers of its own and 
authority to govern itself as it sees fit within the limits of the 
organic law of its creation and the State and Federal Consti-
tutions. Its governing authorities, presumably representing a 
majority of its inhabitants and voicing their will, have deter-
mined, not that industrial development shall cease at its 
boundaries, but that the course of such development shall 
proceed within definitely fixed lines.222 
Euclid needed zoning authority to avoid the threat of development 
posed by Cleveland and to "divert an industrial flow from the course 
which it would follow, to the injury of the residential public if left 
alone, to another course where such injury will be obviated. ''223 
Where apartments were concerned, the Court viewed them as 
much of a threat to detached dwellings as Cleveland was to Euclid.224 
While detached dwellings attracted upstanding citizens, apartment 
buildings attracted congestion, noise and danger to those living in 
detached dwellings.225 The Court concluded that "[u]nder these cir-
cumstances, apartment houses, which in a different environment 
would be not only entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable, come 
220 See id. at 38~7. The Court explained: 
Building zone laws are of modern origin. They began in this country 
about 25 years ago. Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; 
but with the great increase and concentration of population, problems have 
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to 
require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private 
lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity 
of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now 
uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably 
would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. 
Id. at 386. 
221 SeeEuclid, 272 U.s. at 389, 391, 394. 
m See id. at 389. 
22$ See id. at 390. 
224 See id. at 394. 
225 See id. 
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very near to being nuisances. "226 Consequently, the Court found that 
"home" dwellers needed the protection of the police power.227 
The Court gave little notice to Ambler's arguments regarding the 
property rights of individual property holders, despite their promi-
nence in the district court's decision.228 The conjunction of the threat 
of apartment buildings and the need to protect Euclid and its resi-
dents guaranteed that the property rights of the community clearly 
outweighed the claim of any individual property owner.229 While the 
Court did consider individual property owners, it focused on the resi-
dential property holders who would be threatened by commercial or 
business uses.230 Residential use districts could not tolerate commer-
cial development.231 The Court reasoned that: 
the segregation of residential, business and industrial build-
ings . . . will increase the safety and security of home life; 
greatly tend to prevent street accidents, especially to chil-
dren, by reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in resi-
dential sections; decrease noise and other conditions which 
produce or intensify nervous disorder; preserve a more fa-
vorable environment in which to rear children .... 232 
Thus, allowing Ambler to develop its property in any manner other 
than residential would imperil Euclid.233 
C. Zoning Since Euclid 
Assessing whether the goals formulated in Euclid have been 
achieved requires identifying the zoning plan then implemented as 
well as its effects.234 Since this plan has undergone a variety of permu-
tations, these developments likewise warrant consideration.235 
226 Euclid, 272 u.s. at 394-95. 
227 See id. at 394. The police power, while not explicitly mentioned, is implicit here. See 
id. 
228 See generaUy Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), 
rev'd, 272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
m See Euclid, 272 u.s. at 389. 
230 See id. at 389-90. Such uses include apartment housing. See id. 
231 See id. at 394. 
232Id. 
233 See id. 
234 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1005. 
235 See id. 
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1. The Initial General Structure 
a. The Comprehensive Plan 
Regarding comprehensive planning's connection to zoning, a 
leading author on modern property and zoning law has observed that 
[w]hile there will undoubtedly be variations between the 
Zoning plans adopted by various cities, most zoning plans 
look to the Standard State Zone Enabling Act [the Standard 
Act], which was adopted at one time or another in all 50 
states and is still in effect (with alterations) in many of 
them.236 
Section 3 of the Standard Act states that zoning regulations shall be 
"in accordance with a comprehensive plan. "237 Such plans set out the 
local government's objectives and standards for development, com-
prising maps, charts, and descriptive text and showing general 
boundaries of height; area, bulk, and use zones as well as the location 
of, inter alia, streets, bridges, parks, and public buildings.238 Courts, 
however, have generally not required that a plan be written in a 
document separate from the zoning ordinance itself.239 Some courts 
have even gone so far as to hold that the subsequent amending of 
zoning regulations implicitly and automatically changes the plan on 
which they are based.240 Furthermore, even when a formal, written 
plan exists, zoning regulations which are inconsistent with it are not 
necessarily invalid.241 
256 1d. A few states-most notably California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania-have in 
recent years enacted tailor-made statutes that depart significantly from the STANDARD ACT. 
See sufrra note 13; DUXEMINIER Be KRIER, supra note 4, at 1005. Even these examples, how-
ever, reflect the Standard Act's continuing influence. See DUXEMINIER Be KRIER, sufrra note 
4, at 1005. 
257 STANDARD ACT, sufrra note 13. 
2S8 See DUXEMINIER Be KRIER, sufrra note 4, at 1007. 'This plan is based on surveys and 
studies of the city's present situation and future needs, the idea being to anticipate change 
and promote harmonious development. To require some sort of master plan and regula-
tions 'in accordance' with it, as enabling legislation typically does, reflects the view that 
zoning itself is but a means of giving effect to a larger planning enterprise that has led to 
formulation of the comprehensive plan." 1d. 
259 See Ward v. Montgomery Township, 147 A2d 248, 252 (NJ. 1959)(holding that 
M[t]he zoning ordinance itself may bespeak the scheme; there need be no extrinsic 
guide"). 
240 See generally Mott's Realty Corp. v. Town Plan Be Zoning Comm'n, 209 A2d 179 
(Conn. 1965). 
241 SeeTown of Bedford v. Village ofMt. Kisco, 306 N.E.2d 155,159 (N.Y. 1973) (hold-
ing that M[w]hat is mandated is that there be comprehensiveness of planning, rather than 
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b. Implementing the Plan: Zoning Ordinances and Subdivision Controls 
As Euclid and the comments directly above note, zoning ordi-
nances represent a set of regulations enacted by the local legislative 
body which local officials enforce.242 They typically specify how desig-
nated areas may be used, the "types and sizes of structures that may be 
built within those areas, and the placement of the structures (set-
backs, sidelots, and so forth)."243 The ordinances commonly specify 
minimum lot size and floor space requirements for residential dwell-
ings and contain controls on advertising with regard to commercial 
zones.244 Moreover, they often contain special districts, with their own 
peculiar structural restrictions, for airports, floodplains, and areas of 
historical importance.245 
Review by local officials of plans for proposed developments rep-
resents the primary enforcement mechanism for zoning regula-
tions.246 Local officials grant permits for new construction or remodel-
ing only if proposals conform to the applicable zoning restrictions.247 
Consequently, denying a building permit or certificate of occupancy 
represents the chief means for enforcing zoning regulations.248 Alter-
natively, private citizens may playa role in enforcing such regulations 
by complaining to local officials that zoning laws are not being en-
forced.249 If local officials do not heed these complaints, property 
owners injured as a result of this nonenforcement may sue for an in-
junction or for mandamus against the passive officials.25o Generally, 
cities have an administrative body such as a board of adjustment or 
zoning appeals to review the decisions of local officials and to grant 
exceptions of one sort or another in special cases.251 Typically, how-
ever, these boards are not empowered to amend the zoning ordi-
special interest, irrational ad hocery. The obligation is support of comprehensive plan-
ning, not slavish servitude to any particular comprehensive plan. Indeed sound planning 
inherently calls for recognition of the dynamics of change.") . 
242 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1009. 
243Id. 
244 See id. 
245 See id. 
246 See id. 
247 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1009. 
248 See id. While many zoning ordinances provide criminal penalties for proceeding 
without appropriate approvals, orders of compliance are the more commonly used en-
forcement tool. See id. 
249 See STANDARD ACT, supra note 13, § 7, at 218-20. 
250 SeeDUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1009-10. 
251 See id. at 1010; see also STANDARD ACT, supra note 13, § 7, at 218-20. 
2000] Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 551 
nance.252 Actions of such boards as well as those of the local legislative 
body are subject to judicial review.253 
In addition to zoning ordinances, a comprehensive plan may be 
implemented by means of subdivision controls, ordinances which set 
out standards and procedures to govern the breaking up of tracts of 
land into lots for sale before or after development.254 Generally, such 
controls mandate the consideration of factors such as light and air, 
transportation flows, recreational needs, and water and sanitary facili-
ties.255 The desire to ensure that necessary public services and public 
improvements will be provided before a proposal's approval, in part, 
motivates subdivision regulation.256 
2. Working Flexibility into the Plan 
By binding limited classes of uses into tightly drawn districts, 
Euclidean zoning can inflict inequitable hardships and promote 
inefficient patterns of landuse.257 Consequently, a number of methods 
for allowing flexibility into the process have developed.258 Whenever a 
Euclidean zone is established, there is a chance that some existing 
structures will not conform to this zone.259 Courts generally have held 
that property owners hold property in subordination to the right of 
reasonable regulation by the government, granting a presumption of 
validity to zoning.260 Courts have tempered this conclusion, however, 
with the recognition that property owners have a constitutionally 
guaranteed right to use property unfettered by governmental restric-
tions.261 Uses which violate a law or create a nuisance, however, as well 
as violations by the owner of covenants, restrictions, or easements, 
limit this right.262 This led to the introduction of a nonconforming 
252 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1010; see also STANDARD ACT, supra note 
13, § 7, at 218-20. 
255 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1010. 
254 See id. 
255 See id. 
256 See id. 
257 See KUNSTLER, supra note 2, passim (arguing, inter alia, that Euclidean zoning has 
led to a lack of affordable housing); see also JACOBS, supra note 2, passim (arguing that such 
zoning inhibits socially and aesthetically desirable diversity). 
258 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1021. 
259 See generally PA Northwestern Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 526 Pa. 186 
(Penn. 1991). 
260 See id. at 191. 
261 See id. 
262 See id. 
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use exception whereby municipalities are seen to lack the power to 
change the nature of an existing lawful use of property.263 
The Standard Act offers property owners two avenues for intro-
ducing nonconforming structure into a Euclidean district: special ex-
ceptions and variances.264 Section 7 authorizes the appointment of a 
board of adjustment that may "in appropriate cases and subject to ap-
propriate conditions and safeguards, make special exceptions to the 
terms of the ordinance in harmony with its general purpose and in-
tent . . . .''265 Further, Section 7 allows the board to authorize "in 
specific cases such variances from the terms of the ordinance as will 
not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special condi-
tions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will re-
sult in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance 
shall be observed and substantial justice done. "266 
Though they are often confused with one another, special excep-
tions and variances differ significantly.267 Variances, on the one hand, 
represent administratively authorized departures from the terms of 
the zoning ordinance, granted in cases of unique and individual 
hardship, in which a strict application of the terms of the ordinance 
would be unconstitutiona1.268 Local officials grant variances, then, to 
avoid an unfavorable holding on constitutionality.269 Special excep-
tions, on the other hand, represent uses permitted by the ordinance 
in a district with which the use is not necessarily incompatible, but 
where it might cause harm if not watched.27o Exceptions are author-
ized under conditions which ensure their compatibility with sur-
rounding uses.271 Generally, a use which is the subject of a special ex-
ception demands a large amount of land, may be public or semi-
public in character, and might often be noxious or offensive.272 Under 
the Standard Act, therefore, boards of adjustment may decide when 
to grant special exceptions and variances.273 It should be noted, how-
~65 See PA Northwestern Distribs., 526 Pa. at 192. 
264 See STANDARD ACT, supra note 13, § 7, at 218-20. 
265 Id. 
~Id. 
~7 See Daniel R. Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administration, 
1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 60, 62-63. 
268 See id. 
m Seeid. 
270 See id. 
271 See id. 
272 See Mandelker, supra note 267, at 62-63. 
275 See STANDARD ACT, supra note 13, at § 7, at 218-20. 
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ever, that Courts have held extremely broad delegations of power, 
from state legislatures to boards of adjustment, unconstitutiona1.274 
In addition to the flexibility provisions in § 7 of the Standard Act, 
the Zoning Commission set out in § 6 has the power to change zoning 
ordinances.275 Some courts, however, have limited this amendment 
power to changes that are consistent with the Comprehensive Plan.276 
The worry that a board of adjustment will grant permission to use an 
"island" of land for a more intensive use than permitted on adjacent 
properties-a practice known as "spot zoning" -partially motivates 
this limitation.277 
Property owners may pursue a number of other traditional 
flexibility options besides those within the Standard Act.278 For exam-
ple, under the practice of contract rezoning, the property owner and 
the government enter into a reciprocal agreement.279 The owner 
promises to restrict the use of the property in exchange for the gov-
ernment's promise to rezone.280 Courts once regarded contract rezon-
ing as illegal per se, which led to the label "conditional" to help avoid 
invalidity.281 Under this related practice of conditional rezoning, a 
property owner agrees to certain conditions as a prerequisite to zon-
ing change, while the local government makes no commitments.282 
Still, in some instances, courts consider conditional or contract rezon-
ing per se invalid, motivated by concerns of piecemeal deterioration 
in the comprehensive plan and fear of abuse and favoritism.283 Courts, 
however, with few exceptions, increasingly have approved conditional 
rezoning, though particular applications can be invalidated.284 
274 See generally Cope v. Inhabitants of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223 (Me. 1983). 
275 See STANDARD ACT, supra note 13, at 217. 
276 See generally Fasano v. Board ofCountyComm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). 
277 See DONALD G. HAGMAN & JUUAN C. JERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND 
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw 168-69 (2d ed. 1986). Notably, "spot zoning is found invalid 
where some or all of the following factors are present: 1. a small parcel of land is singled 
out for special and privileged treatment; 2. the singling out is not in the public interest but 
only for the benefit of the landowner; 3. the action is not in accord with a comprehensive 
plan." Id. 
278 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1046-50, 1055-56, 1063-64. 
279 See id. at 1055. 
280 See id. 
281 See id. 
282 See id. 
28~ See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1055. 
284 See generally Judith Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, De-
velopment Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. 
REv. 957 (1987). 
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Property owners may pursue a number of relatively new, non-
traditional flexibility options: floating zones, cluster zones, and 
planned unit developments (PUDs).285 In the practice of floating 
zones, a city defines a zone but reserves the decision about its location 
for the future.286 Generally, the city first creates a use district by an 
ordinance that specifies standards and criteria to govern the uses 
permitted in the zone.287 Then, at some later time, the city attaches 
the zone to a particular area through a zoning amendment, usually at 
a developer or property owner's request.288 Such zones have been 
challenged on a number of grounds: failure to comply with a com-
prehensive plan, spot zoning, lack of authorization by enabling legis-
lation, and unlawful delegation of legislative authority.289 
In cluster zoning, zoning officials permit developers to construct 
dwellings in a pattern not in compliance with the area restrictions of a 
zoning ordinance.290 While residences in such zones need not observe 
the usual frontage or setback regulations and side-yard or rear-yard 
requirements, overall population density does not exceed other resi-
dential areas sinc::e open spaces are preserved as an element of the 
cluster.291 In PUDs, on the other hand, zoning officials permit devel-
opers to construct dwellings in a pattern not in compliance with ei-
ther the area or use restrictions of a zoning ordinance.292 Still, PUDs 
avoid the spot zoning problem by incorporating enough structures 
within the PUD which do conform to the comprehensive plan to bal-
ance against the differences of those that do not.293 
Developers may obtain permission for cluster zones and PUDs in 
a number of ways, e.g., where a board of adjustment issues a special 
exception, a planning board administers subdivision controls, or a 
legislature creates a floating zone, the most common approach.294 
Courts have tolerated cluster zones and PUDs insofar as the relevant 
ordinance specifies adequate standards.295 As always, courts worry 
about failure to comply with a comprehensive plan, spot zoning, lack 
285 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1063-64. 
286 See id. 
287 See id. 
288 See id. 
289 See Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 241 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1968). 
290 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1064. 
291 See id. 
292 See id. at 1065. 
293 See id. 
294 See id. at 1064. 
295 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 1065. 
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of authorization by enabling legislation, and unlawful delegation of 
legislative authority.296 
III. EUCLIDEAN ZONING AS PROBLEM-SOLVING 
Cognitive Science offers the tools for analyzing whether Euclid-
ean zoning, as a problem-solving process with distinct phases, repre-
sents an effective problem-solving effort.297 An examination of the 
goal of Euclidean zoning as formulated in Euclid, and its current 
status as embodied in the Standard Act, permits an evaluation of this 
problem-solving effort.298 Discerning how Euclidean zoning deviates 
from an optimal problem-solving effort suggests ways to improve its 
problem-solving effort.299 
That the goal of Euclidean zoning was formulated in Euclid and 
has been executed for nearly a century since, raises a preliminary 
question: Who is the decision-maker in such an enterprise? In actual-
ity, Euclidean zoning represents a group effort involving state and 10-
cal legislatures, administrators on zoning commissions and boards of 
appeal, the courts, and citizens.300 Presumably, administrative officials 
on the zoning commissions and boards of adjustment have the most 
experience with zoning issues.301 As will become evident, the tension 
between these groups-legislatures, administrators in the zoning 
commission and boards of appeal, the courts, and citizens-in virtue 
of the roles they each play in the problem-solving process represents 
an obstacle to effective decision-making. 
A. The Goal of Euclidean Zoning 
What is the goal of Euclidean zoning? While the Supreme Court 
in Euclid provided a starting point for a discussion of goals, the judi-
cial branch is ill-suited to formulate specific goals.302 For example, the 
Court in Euclid generally held that zoning is permissible if it repre-
sents a valid use of the police power, i.e., when employed to protect 
the general health, safety, and welfare of the population.303 Conse-
296Seeid. 
297 See DORNER, supra note 8, passim. 
298 Seeid. 
299Seeid. 
SOO See STANDARD ACT, supra note 13, §§ 6,7. 
SOl See id. This assumes that those who interact most frequently with those requesting 
permits will most frequently consider the status of zoning. See id. 
S02 See id. 
SO! SeeVillage of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926). 
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quently, the protection of the general health, safety, and welfare of 
the community represents one possible formulation of the goal of 
Euclidean zoning. !1M 
While Euclidean zoning did and still does entertain the protec-
tion of the general health, safety, and welfare of the population, this 
formulation represents, in Cognitive Science terms, a negative, gen-
eral, multiple, and unclear goal.!105 It represents a negative goal be-
cause it specifies only that the present state is not the desired state.!106 
As noted above, such goals are not generally achieved since negatively 
defined goals are generally less clear than positively stated goals.!107 
The more clearly a goal is stated, the more likely it will be achiev;ed.308 
Further, this formulation represents a general goal because de-
termining whether it has been achieved requires the examination of 
only a few criteria: Have the health, safety, and welfare of the ,popula-
tion been protected?!109 This again indicates a lack of clarity, .decreas-
ing the likelihood that such a goal will be achieved.310 This goal of 
protecting the population's health, safety, and welfare is mulpple, and 
while this in itself does not tend to make goals less likely to be real-
ized, the individual goals constituting this multiplicity are th~mselves 
unclear: What will count as a protection of the population's health, 
safety, and welfare?311 .. 
The Supreme Court provides other possible formulations of the 
goal of Euclidean zoning in its various narrower holding~ in Euclid.312 
For example, the Court held that cities should be able to protect 
themselves from growth and change.!ll!l Like the goal to/ promote the 
health, safety, and welfare of the community, this formulation repre-
sents a general and negative goal.314 Moreover, since a city presumably 
will want to allow beneficial growth and change and oqly prevent that 
which will harm the welfare, this formulation offers no. greater level of 
specification over the initial formulation.Sl5 The C01p't's strenuous 
S04 See id. 
305 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 50-51. 
S06 See id. at 50. 
507 See id. 
508 See id. 
509Seeid. 
310 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 50. 
m See id. at 51. 
312 See generally Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365. 
m See id. at 386-87. 
314 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 50. 
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denunciation of apartment houses represents perhaps the most nar-
row holding in Euclid-such buildings attract congestion, noise, and 
danger to those living in detached dwellings, and consequently, the 
~oal of zoning is to prevent this.316 While this formulation offers more 
r>ecificity, providing a number of criteria for determining whether it 
as been met, it says nothing about what will count as congestion, 
~ise, or danger to those living in detached dwellings.317 Further-
~re, it may still be interpreted as a negative goal, since it stipulates 
w1t to avoid rather than what to achieve.318 
This suggests the role which courts will play in problem-solving. 
Th'role of courts in judicial review is the adjudication of individual 
disPtes where individual parties are named, and the relevant action 
has .... eady occurred.319 Unlike legislation, court decisions generally 
do nt. have prospective effect.32O Given that goals are essentially pro-
specti~, the courts are ill-suited to formulate anything but the most 
genen goals.321 In certain circumstances, however, court decisions do 
affect lore than individualized parties in adjudications, for example, 
where ctourt finds legislation unconstitutional,322 Essentially, then, in 
cases suI} as Euclid, the role of judicial review in the overall process of 
problemolving is to decide whether a given goal or solution-legisla-
tion or r~lation-is constitutional. It is no surprise then that Euclid 
provides ~ch general goals; these are the constitutional boundaries 
on the typs of goals the legislature may set. In short, such holdings 
represent lermission for legislatures to proceed and supply more 
specific andoositive goals. 
The legolative response to this permission is found in the Stan-
dard Act, whth essentially represents a narrowing of the general goal 
provided, or nore appropriately permitted, by the Court in Euclid.323 
Enacted by shte legislatures, the Standard Act delegates power to 
municipalities vith an express goal 
~16 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394. 
m Seeid. 
~18 See id.; DORNER,5upra note 8, at 50. 
~19 See JERRY L. MAsHAW, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: THE AMERICAN PUBUC LAw 
SYSTEM CASES AND MATIRIALS 362-63 (4th ed. 1998). 
~20 See id. 
~21 See DORNER, supr(j note 8, at 49. 
322 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that legistative action will 
only have legal effect where it satisfies the constitutional requirements of bicameralism 
and presentment, thereby invalidating a plethora of single house and joint resolutions). 
~2~ See gmerally STANDARD ACT, supra note 13. 
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to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, 
panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general 
welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the 
overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of 
population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transpor-
tation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public re-
quirements.324 
In making such regulations, municipalities must reasonably con~er, 
among other things, the character of the district and its peculiafollil.-
ability for particular uses, with a view to conserving the value of mld-
ings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land thro ;hout 
the municipality.325 While this delegation does, in fact, nar:W the 
goals provided by Euclid, decisions of the Zoning Commissior. egard-
ing district boundaries and zoning ordinances represent ev(t more 
specific goals which narrow the goals provided to them eve' illrther. 
The same may be said of the granting of variances and spedl excep-
tion by boards of adjustment.326 Consequently, the form~ation of 
goals in zoning primarily occurs at the individualized level.fhe rela-
tionship, then, between state legislatures and municipal uthorities 
such as zoning commissions and boards of appeal, is analo~i)Us to that 
between the Supreme Court in Euclid and state legislatu~~: the for-
mer provides the latter with a general goal, granting tie latter the 
authority to set more specific goals with which to read!this former 
goa1.327 
On its face, this structure for goal formulation yieJ<8 goals with a 
high likelihood of being achieved because the actior: ·)f municipal 
administrators will represent positive, specific and de;f goals.328 Nev-
ertheless, the goals identified by either a zoning comn1r sion or board 
524Id. § 3, at 214-15. 
325 See id. 
526 Granted, it may not initially be clear that these individual';J; j decisions represent 
part of the goal formulation phase of problem solving, and not pa' 1,.f the implementation 
of the resulting plan. Still, insofar as the most general goal of La :lidean zoning as pro-
vided by the Supreme Court in Euclid is to protect the health, it ety and welfare of the 
population, every action taken in specific furtherance of this get.t al goal may be alterna-
tively described either as an implementation of this general goa eras a narrowing of this 
general goal. For example, the granting of a variance by a boarel)f adjustment under the 
STANDARD ACT ultimately represents an attempt to protect the h ~ lth, safety and welfare of 
the population. Alternatively described, the board has set a me ce specific goal, namely, 
achieving some benefit-or avoiding some evil-which the variaJl~e achieves. 
527 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395; see grmeraUy STANDARD ACT, sujr,'a note 13. 
528 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 50-51. 
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of adjustment must conform to the general goals set out by the state 
legislature and the Supreme Court-goals must be constitutionally 
permissible.329 This division of labor introduces several obstacles to 
effective problem-solving insofar as those with the most exposure to 
the relevant system-members of the zoning commission and board 
of adjustment-are constrained by those with less exposure to this 
system. Since this issue arises in later phases of the problem-solving 
.;" process, further discussion will be postponed.330 
. B. ModelFormulation, Action, and Amendment in Euclidean Zoning 
Like the goal formulation phase, the formulation of models and 
gathering of information phase of problem-solving involves a variety 
of instlitutional entities in the problem-solving process, namely, the 
state legislature as well as the zoning commission and the board of 
adjustment.331 Moreover, in both phases, the state legislature presents 
a subordinate body with either a general goal or model along with an 
authorization allowing the subordinate body either to set out more 
narrow goals, or to fill in gaps in the existing model,332 Likewise, the 
subordinate body is constrained in its ability to act inconsistently with 
this delegation because in much the same way that a board of adjust-
ment may .not act so as to harm the public-a violation of its dele-
gated goal~it may not completely reject the model contemplated by 
the Standard Act. 333 
In short, whatever model was contemplated in the conception of 
the Standard Act, this model comes to those who are most familiar 
with this system, the zoning commission and the board of adjustment, 
in a prepackaged form.334 Further, this model is based on a fairly lim-
ited number Qf variables: use, population, height, etc.335 While 
changes implemented by the zoning commission may alter the com-
prehensive plan, the underlying model contemplated by the Standard 
Act, comprising elements such as use, population density, height of 
buildings, etc., may not be altered by anyone other than the state leg-
islature.336 
~29 &e Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389; see generally STANDARD ACT, supra note 13. 
530 &e infra Section III.B-C. 
551 See generally STANDARD ACT, supra note 13. 
m &e id., §§ 2-3, at 214-15. 
353 See id., §§ 1-3, at 212-15. 
5M See id., §§ 2-3 at 214-15. 
335 See id., § 1, at 213. 
~36 See STANDARD ACT, supra note 13, § 5, at 216-17. 
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The Standard Act deviates from optimal problem-solving at sev-
eral points here. Those who are most familiar with the given system 
are constrained in their ability to affect radically the model given to 
them.337 Ideally, it is the problem-solver who is most familiar with the 
system at hand who forms the model for hypothesizing.338 Coming to 
understand such systems presumably requires considerable effort, as 
the discussion above regarding analogical reasoning and narrowing of 
the problem sector demonstrates.339 The factors considered in the .. 
Standard Act have changed little since Euclid. While it is possible that 
the model conceived at that time was sufficient, the process contem-
plated by the Standard Act renders it impossible for those most likely 
to discover some new nuance of this system to incorporate this ele-
ment into the new model on their own.340 Rather, such an amend-
ment of the Enabling Act requires legislation. 341 
For example, some have suggested that Euclidean zoning has en-
gendered suburban sprawl, which in turn has required an increase in 
automobile usage, leading in turn to an increase in air pollution.342 
This increase in automobile usage spawned further suburban sprawl 
since the automobile allows suburbanites to move away from the 
sprawl and pollution.343 In essence, such arguments posit that auto-
mobile usage as well as suburban sprawl are regulated by positive 
feedback-an increase in either produces a further increase in that 
same variable.344 While Euclid as well as the Standard Act contem-
plated air pollution as well as population density as relevant variables, 
the discovery that such variables are governed by positive feedback is 
not incorporated into such a mode1.345 
Presumably, such novel relationships between variables occasion-
ally will be discovered. Under the Standard Act, those most likely to 
make such discoveries must appeal for legislative amendment were 
they to consider the introduction of a zone not contemplated by a 
337 See id. (stating that the legislature holds the power to amend, supplement, change, 
modify, or repeal the zoning regulation) . 
338 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 43. While Dorner never says this explicitly, it is clear 
from his discussion that there is one individual (or group of individuals) who undertakes 
each phase of the decision-making process. See id. 
339 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 77. 
340 See STANDARD ACT, supra note 13, § 5, at 216-17. 
341 See id. 
342 See KUNSTLER, supra note 2, at 43, 64-65. 
343 See id. at 65. 
344 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 74. 
345 See STANDARD ACT, supra note 13, § 1, at 213. 
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comprehensive plan.M6 Consider, for example, a proposal to deal with 
increasing auto pollution and traffic by creating a district based on 
automobile usage according to which only a certain amount of vehi-
cles could be owned or operated per capita. A zoning commission 
probably would need legislative amendment to create such a dis-
trict.347 On its face, this result may not appear problematic: If the 
problem represents enough of a problem to warrant such a district, 
" the hurdle represented by needing to appeal to the legislature does 
Ilot amount to much of a hurdle since the significance will suffice to 
persuade a legislature that it should amend the model. Additionally, 
as elected officials, a legislature is responsible to the public in a way in 
which members of a zoning commission or board of adjustment are 
not. The system, then, should be left as it is. 
C. The Underlying Problem 
The response that the legislature is elected-and therefore re-
sponsible to the public-while administrators are not, raises perhaps 
the most central issue in Euclidean zoning: the tension between allow-
ing flexibility in zoning while at the same time avoiding abuse of dis-
cretion by government officials.348 From a decision-making perspec-
tive, the traditional dispute regarding flexiblity takes on a novel form. 
Traditionally, discussions of flexibility in Euclidean zoning concern 
whether districts can be stretched-made less restrictive-to accom-
modate property owners.349 The issue of flexibility here concerns al-
lowing those with the most expertise to make the decisions, both as to 
goal formulation as well as model formulation and, as will become 
evident, plan implementation. The flexibility at issue here will some-
times allow an expert to be even more restrictive in what uses she per-
mits than traditional Euclidean zoning. 
Likewise, the traditional notion of abuse of discretion typically 
involves a government official who exploits flexibility provisions in a 
way that harms, rather than enhances, the health, safety, and welfare 
of the population.S50 Such decisions would surely displease an elector-
ate, thus ensuring that the police power is not abused by anyone over 
whom the electorate has voting power. In the framework under con-
546 See id., § 5, at 216-17. 
347 See id. 
M8 SeeDUKEMINIER, supra note 163, at 1009-10. 
549 See id. at 10 1 0-11. 
S50 See id. at 1008. 
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sideration, the expert decision-maker is trying to make a decision that 
would enhance the health, safety, or welfare of the population. Zon-
ing which restricted automobile usage would not be an abuse of dis-
cretion under the traditional notion. Still, it would be unpopular with 
an electorate.351 Even when an action is taken for the good of the 
community as a whole, the individual community members may not 
want it.352 Such decisions are best left to experts who are insulated \ 
from the political process, a basic tenet of administrative law.353 
In the prediction and extrapolation phase of problem-solving, 
members of a zoning commission or board of adjustment are, in one 
sense, not burdened to the extent that they are in the model formula-
tion stage because they are not limited in what inferences they may 
draw as to what effects a given course of action will have. They are, 
nevertheless, limited insofar as the model upon which they base these 
hypotheses is partially beyond their control since non-expert legisla-
tors provide it to them.354 
This constraint upon the expert decision-maker arises most 
forcibly at the implementation and final reviewing and revising phases 
of problem-solving.355 Granted, the zoning commission may recom-
mend districts and zones; likewise, the board of adjustment may grant 
a variance or special exception. The zoning commission, however, 
only makes a recommendation; there is no guarantee it will be 
adopted. The power of the board of adjustment, in turn, in making 
special exceptions is limited insofar as such exceptions are possible 
only where expressly authorized by ordinances passed by the local leg-
islature, since legislative attempts to provide boards of adjustment 
with broad delegations of power to grant exceptions have been held 
unconstitutional. 356 
351 See id. at 58-61; see also Richard Lacayo, The Brawl Over Sprawl, TIME, Mar. 22, 1999, 
at 48. Specifically, in a Time/CNN telephone poll of 1,024 adult Americans taken onJanu-
ary 20 and 21, 1999 by Yankelovich Partners Inc., participants were asked which is more 
important: (1) the ability of individuals to do what they want with land that they own; or 
(2) the ability of government to regulate development for the common good. See id. Sixty-
nine percent of the participants chose the former over the latter. See id. Twenty-five per-
cent of the participants chose the latter. See id. 
352 See Lacayo, supra note 351, at 48. 
353 SeeAnMINIsTRATIVE LAw, supra note 321, at 29, 210-13. 
354 See grmeraUy STANDARD ACT, supra note 13. 
355 It should be noted that, even if there were no new constraint on the ability of a zon-
ing commission or board of adjustment to implement a plan, to the extent that they are 
limited in what goals they may set and what general systematic model they may conceive, 
their ability to plan and implement action is constrained. See id. 
356 See Cope v. Inhabitants of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223, 227 (Me. 1983). 
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Finally, boards of adjustment are limited by the very nature of 
their appellate power. For example, the power to grant a variance un-
der Section 7 of the Standard Act is constrained by the requirement 
that the variances be granted only in cases of unique and individual 
hardship.357 Moreover, both variances and special exceptions require 
that a property-owner approach a board of adjustment.358 The Board 
itself does not introduce these actions, but reacts to demands from 
,; individual property owners.359 This applies equally to cluster zones, 
PUDs, and conditional rezoning.360 Thus, most of the decisions made 
will arise only when a property owner-a representative of the mar-
ketplace-comes forward to make a request. As many have noted, the 
environmental consequences of granting the marketplace a central 
role in decision-making can be disastrous.1I61 
IV. SOLVING THE PROBLEM: MODERATING ELECTORAL AND 
JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS 
As noted above, the primary problem at every stage of the prob-
lem-solving effort represented in Euclidean zoning by the Standard 
Act is that those with the most expertise are constrained in the exer-
cise of decision-making power. These constraints fall into two general 
categories which may be described as either electoral or judicial in 
nature. Electoral constraints are found when citizens are able to re-
strain effective problem-solving either by voting down measures or the 
officials who propose them. Judicial constraints, in turn, are found 
wherever courts are able to restrain effective problem-solving, e.g., in 
cases of judicial review. While neither constraint can or should be 
eliminated, it may nevertheless be possible to reduce their effect on 
the decision-making of those with the most experience, namely, zon-
ing commissions and boards of adjustment. 
One possibility for reducing constraints on the decision-making 
of those with the most experience would be to educate legislators, 
providing them with experience. The use of legislative committees 
presumably is motivated by the desire for certain members of a legis-
lature to be especially knowledgeable regarding some specific subject 
357 See STANDARD ACT, supra note 13, § 7, at 218; Commons v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment, 41OA.2d 1138, 1142 (NJ. 1980). 
!5S See STANDARD ACT, supra note 13, § 7, at 218. 
!59 See id. 
560 SeeDUKEMINIER, supra note 163, at 1063-64. 
361 See PLATER, supra note 42, at 57-60 (citing Sax, Property Rights and the Econumy of Na-
ture, 45 STANFORD L. REv. 1433 (1993». 
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matter. It is unlikely, however, that even a portion of a given state or 
local legislature could devote sufficient time to such an endeavor. 
Moreover, this would not avoid the democratic constraints on passing 
unpopular, albeit necessary measures. 
Another possibility for reducing the constraints on the decision-
making of those with the most experience would be to delegate more 
power to those on zoning commissions. As noted, however, some • 
courts have found broad delegations of power unconstitutional. 362 
There may, however, be a number of routes around this issue. At the 
federal level, concerns regarding overbroad delegations have been on 
the wane.363 The federal government's tendency to delegate broadly 
to administrative agencies-the expert decision-makers-indicates a 
recognition that broad delegations may be permissible in some in-
stances. The federal government offers a delegation possibility in 
which broad powers are delegated, on the condition that whatever 
substantial decision is made will face an up or down vote from the leg-
islature.364 Any judicial issues with the constitutionality of such a 
broad delegation, then, may be addressed by noting the attenuation 
in delegation concerns as well as the possibility that a complete dele-
gation of power may yet allow legislative control over an abuse of dis-
cretion by the zoning commission or board of adjustment. 
While such a broad delegation would minimize, within constitu-
tional limits, the electoral constraints on decision-making, judicial 
constraints remain. There are two possibilities here. First, legislatures 
could enact statutes which require a number of administrative appeals 
prior to judicial review. This exhaustion requirement has been recog-
nized by courts as a prudential doctrine, in part because the court 
understands that it should let experts consider the issue first.365 
362 See Cope, 464 A.2d at 227. 
363 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) 
(holding that Secretary of Labor exceeded the powers granted to him in the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, implicitly rejecting the view held by then:Justice Rehnquist 
in the dissent who argued that the fairly broad delegation of powers in that act was an 
abdication oflegislative power). 
364 See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK & 
MICHAEL]' GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAw, 416-17 (2d ed. 
1993). In trade agreements, Congress delegates its own Article I, § 8 ability to regulate 
commerce with other nations to the President. See 19 U.S.C. § 2112. It prevents the execu-
tive from abusing this delegation by setting conditions precedent, one of which is that 
whatever trade agreement he negotiates will be subject to just such an up or down vote. See 
19 U.S.C. § 2191(f), (g). 
365 See Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 153 (1993) (holding that courts will show "ap-
propriate deference to Congress' powers to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under 
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Increasing the exhaustion requirement, however, only delays ju-
dicial review.366 Still, while such review is not necessarily undesirable-
the judiciary's ability to review for constitutionality should not, and 
cannot, be abrogated-judicial review of non-constitutional issues 
may be constrained.3s7 For example, under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, legislatures may constrain, if not eliminate, judicial review of 
agency action.368 The judiciary's ability to review constitutional issues 
will not be abrogated, as the Court has held that the preclusion of ju-
dicial review of constitutional issues will require "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence on Congress' part that such review is precluded.369 In 
this way, then, judicial constraints on experienced decision-makers 
could be minimized, allowing only an evaluation of the constitutional-
ity of their decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The problem-solving effort in Euclidean zoning as embodied in 
the Standard State Zone Enabling Act can be improved in the first 
instance placing the decision-making power in the hands of those 
with the most experience. This, in turn, will allow the formulation of 
goals which are likely to be achieved based on models which most 
closely represent the system in question. Further, by mitigating the 
electoral and judicial constraints upon these decision-makers, the ac-
tions taken by them, as well as any of their corrective measures, will 
not be affected by external forces. Those with the most experience 
with such matters, in short, will not be hindered by those with less ex-
perience.370 This will ensure that Euclidean zoning, as a problem-
solving process with distinct phases, represents an effective problem-
solving effort.371 Consequently, while Euclidean zoning will probably 
which a claim may be heard in a Federal court requires fashioning of exhaustion princi-
ples in a manner consistent with congressional intent and any applicable statutory 
scheme" (quoting McCarthyv. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992»). 
S66 See id. 
367 SeeJohnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974). 
36S See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (1) (stating that agency actions 
will be reviewable "except to the extent that ... statutes preclude judicial review); Johnson, 
415 U.S. at 373-74 (holding that while Administrative Procedure Act § 701 (a) (1) may 
allow statutes to block review by expressly denying it, blocking Constitutional claims will 
require "clear and convincing" evidence on Congress' part, since this is, itself, a constitu-
tionally questionable move). 
369 SeeJohnson, 415 U.S. at 373-74. 
370 See DORNER, supra note 8, at 43. 
m Seeid. 
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continue to envision "the specification of determined geographic ar-
eas separated according to zoning districts with the uses permitted in 
each district set forth in the ordinances," the nature of these districts 
could look considerably different.372 
372 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1618-19 (6th ed. 1990). 
